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Abstract 
This paper develops a simple model to analyze how a lack of political competition may lead 
to policies that hinder economic growth. We test the predictions of the model on panel data 
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political competition and low income growth. 
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One of the most cherished propositions in economics is that, by and large,
monopoly is bad and market competition between ￿rms raises the welfare
of consumers. Whether competition between political parties has similarly
virtuous consequences is far less discussed,1 despite the long-term monopoly
on power by a dominant party observed in a number of existing democracies.2
Moreover, few empirical studies speak to the question of whether political
competition matters for economic outcomes.3
This paper develops a simple theoretical model to think through these
issues. This model illustrates how a positive e⁄ect of political competition
may come about by inducing political parties to implement growth promot-
ing policies rather than special interest policies. The underlying mechanism
is that swing voters, whose voting decision in based on parties￿economic
policy choices, only start to gain electoral in￿ uence if political competition
exceeds a critical threshold. When investigating the empirical contents of this
prediction, our theoretical model guides both the measurement of political
competition and the empirical approach.
Our application exploits the substantial variation in political competi-
tion across U.S. states and time to explore the relationship between political
competition, economic policy, and economic performance. Figure 1 illustrates
some of the variation in our main measure of political competition ￿detailed
below ￿which uses a data set originating in the work of Ansolabehere and
Snyder (2002). This ￿gure displays ten-year averages of political competition
for the four main census regions. The most striking deviation from competi-
tive elections in the ￿gure is the well-known decline in political competition
in the US south after the 1880s that lasts until the 1960s. In our empiri-
cal work, we exploit the variation between di⁄erent regions of the US and,
1The Chicago School of political economy makes a strong argument as to the e¢ ciency
of political competition (Stigler, 1972, and Wittman, 1989, 1995), but has not studied the
detailed institutional underpinnings of this argument. Polo (1998) and Svensson (1998)
provide early formal analyses of how lopsided political competition may lead to excessive
rent-seeking or ine¢ cient provision of government services. Lizzeri and Persico (2005) is
another example.
2A large literature in political science discusses the dominant-party systems in coun-
tries such as Japan (the LDP), Malaysia (the UMNO), Mexico (the IRP), Paraguay (the
Colorado Party), and South Africa (the ANC), focusing on their political e⁄ects (see e.g.,
the contributions in Pempel, 1990).
3Besley and Case (2003) discusses some evidence from studies using U.S. data.
2in particular, the substantial variation in political competition within each
region.
A consistent picture emerges. Higher political competition is associated
with a change in the policy mix towards policies that are widely believed
to be pro-business and growth promoting ￿lower tax revenue as a share
of income, higher infrastructure spending measured by the share of capital
outlays in total state government expenditure, and the presence of right-to-
work laws. These results are robust across a number of speci￿cations. First,
we show that our results hold up when we include separate year-dummy
variables for the south to capture other changes in economic and cultural
trends that are peculiar to the south. Second, our results are also robust
when we instrument for political competition to meet legitimate concerns
about potential reverse causation. Third, to check that our results are due
to political competition and not to political partisanship, we control in a
variety of ways for party strength and control of the state legislature and
governorship. While the party control variables have the expected sign, the
e⁄ect of political competition on policy choices remains virtually unchanged.
Fourth, we show that the e⁄ect of political competition on policy choices
appears non-linear as suggested by the theoretical model. At very low and
very high levels of political competition, changes in political competition have
smaller impacts on policy compared to intermediate levels. Finally, we show
that the results hold in the US south or the US north (more precisely all
non-southern states) separately.
We then investigate whether these changes in economic policy are re-
￿ ected in overall state economic performance by estimating reduced-form
growth regressions with political competition as an explanatory variable.
We ￿nd that over the period after 1929 (from when o¢ cial state personal
income estimates are available), political competition is strongly associated
with higher economic growth rates. This ￿nding is again robust to the wide
variety of speci￿cations that we check for in the policy regressions. Finally,
we obtain very similar results using Easterlin￿ s (1960) estimates of state per-
sonal income for 1880, 1900 and 1920. These lend further credence to the
conclusion that the association between political competition and growth is
not peculiar to the post-1929 period. Taken together, our results provide
robust evidence that political competition bene￿tted economic development
by inducing parties to pursue growth-promoting policies rather than their
private agendas.
In the following, Section 2 develops our theoretical model. Section 3 pro-
3vides some background history of political competition in the United States
and describes our data. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy and results,
while Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
Our model illustrates why political competition may promote economic pol-
icy and growth, although this is not the only possibility (see the end of the
section for further discussion). We choose a speci￿c model which captures
some of the basic features of the empirical application. Two parties com-
pete by picking electoral platforms. To ￿x ideas, we focus on a single policy
which distorts economic decisions and lowers overall income, but transfers
resources to one group of citizens. Lack of political competition is de￿ned as
an electoral advantage of one of two political parties. This advantage arises
from a surplus of committed voters, due to the parties￿non-pliable stance on
a non-economic issue. The electoral advantage gives a dominant party less
incentive to appeal to swing voters, who are not committed to one party and
are prepared to vote against candidates pursuing distorted policies.
At a ￿rst stage in the model, each of the parties picks a policy platform
under uncertainty about a popularity shock. Second, this shock is realized
as voters cast their ballot. Finally, private economic choices are made in
the light of realized policy. The next subsections deal with these choices in
reverse order.
2.1 The Economic Model
We use a reduced-form model of economic decisions.4 There are two time
periods and a (size one) continuum of citizens, each of whom invests one
unit of capital. The ￿rst-period return is normalized at unity, while the
second-period return is q (￿) ￿ 1 where ￿ 2 [0;1] is an economic policy. We
assume that q￿ (￿) < 0, so an increase in ￿ reduces second period income.
However, the policy also creates bene￿ts to a fraction ￿ < 1 of the citizens,
4In a previous version of the paper (Besley, Persson and Sturm, 2006), the model was
given micro-economic foundations, along the lines in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Section
14.3). This extended model has two sectors ￿one traditional, one new ￿and two time
periods. It pivots around quasi-rents earned by owners of traditional factors, and their
incentives to protect these rents at the expense of economic growth.
4who receive a rent of r(￿); where r(0) = 0 and r is an increasing function.
Using the policy ￿ to redistribute income reduces overall surplus, but creates
a net bene￿t for the recipients of the rent r, which implies that
r￿ (￿)
￿
> ￿q￿ (￿) > r￿ (￿) > 0 .
This assumption creates a con￿ ict of interest over policy in a very simple
way: it is optimal for the group that bene￿ts from the policy to set ￿ = 1,
but average income per capita is higher when ￿ = 0. The growth rate of the
economy
G(￿) = q (￿) + r(￿) ￿ 1 (1)
is a decreasing function of ￿; i.e., growth is higher when ￿ is closer to zero.
2.2 The Political Model
There are three types of voters: Democrats, Republicans and independents,
denoted by P 2 fD;R;0g. Partisan voters (Democrats and Republicans)
make up a fraction 1￿￿ of the population. Only Democrats and Republicans
are organized in parties, which are denoted by p 2 fD;Rg. Let ￿(P;p)￿ be
the utility gain of a partisan voter P from having her preferred political
party p in o¢ ce. We assume that ￿ (D;R) = ￿ (R;D) = 0 and ￿ (R;R) =
￿ (D;D) = 1.
We assume that the partisan types D and R prefer their respective party
due to non-economic issues, i.e., their utility gain ￿ dominates any economic
concern. Of these committed voters, a fraction (1 + ￿)=2 prefers party D:
For example, in an application to the US south, ￿ could be the electoral
salience of race. The sign of ￿ can be positive or negative, but to ￿x ideas in
the model presentation we let the Democrats have the edge among committed
voters (￿ > 0):
Independent voters (P = 0) vote primarily on economic issues and become
swing voters. Speci￿cally, their economic payo⁄ of having party p in o¢ ce
depends on the policy choice ￿p of this party and is vp = q(￿p). Independents
also care about the identity of parties, but less so than partisans. Their
political payo⁄ is !, for or against party D￿ s stance on non-economic issues,
with ! Q 0 distributed among the voters. Thus, a swing voter casts her
ballot for party D whenever:
￿ + ! + vD ￿ vR > 0 ;
5where ￿ is an aggregate popularity shock in favor or the Democratic party.








Using this parametrization, the condition for a Democratic electoral vic-
tory, assuming an interior solution, is:
￿￿[vD ￿ vR + ￿] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿=2 > 0 .







is our indicator of the state of political competition, the measurement of
which we discuss in Section 3.
We assume that parties compete by committing themselves to policy plat-
forms f￿D;￿Rg. Moreover, when parties pick their platforms, they know the
distributions of ! and ￿; but not the realization of ￿: To further simplify
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2
1
2 + ￿ [vD ￿ vR ￿ ￿]
0 if ￿ [vD ￿ vR ￿ ￿] ￿ ￿1
2 .
(2)
Evidently, the model predicts the Democrats￿electoral success to depend
on two factors, namely the (endogenous) utility di⁄erence vD ￿ vR; and the
(exogenous) electoral advantage parameter ￿.
The model gives insight into the factors that make political competition
sti⁄er, which corresponds to values of ￿ closer to zero. Political competi-
tion increases as ￿ approaches zero, i.e., when the advantage of either the
Democratic or Republican party among partisan voters declines. Political
competition is also sti⁄er when ￿ is large ￿swing voters make up a larger
fraction of the voting population. Lower salience of non-economic issues
among the swing voters ￿a higher ￿ ￿also raises political competition, as
does a more ideologically neutral set of swing voters.5
5Our assumption that ! is uniformly distributed is made for analytical convenience.
If instead ! had a smooth unimodal distribution, a shift of the mass in this distribution
towards the middle would raise the p.d.f. g! in that range. An increase in the density ￿
of our assumed uniform can be thought of as approximating such a shift towards a more
ideologically neutral electorate.
6For simplicity we assume that all policy rents r(￿) accrue to the winning
party, which makes up a share ￿ of the population. While extreme, this
assumption clearly illustrates why parties may wish to implement anti-growth
policies.6 Average utility of a party member is r(￿)=￿ + q (￿). To map
the rents into swing-voter utility, de￿ne T (v) = [r(q￿1 (v))]=￿ as the rents
enjoyed by the party when the swing voters￿utility is v. (T is a decreasing
function). Let ￿ v be the swing voters￿preferred utility level (with T (￿ v) = 0)
and let 1 + Tv (v) = 0 de￿ne the level of swing-voter utility that maximizes
party utility with q￿1 (v) 2 (0;1).
Electoral competition can now be modeled as parties choosing fvD;vRg
rather than the underlying policies f￿D;￿Rg. The expected payo⁄ of the
Democratic party is:
vR + PD (vD ￿ vR ￿ ￿)[￿ + T (vD) + vD ￿ vR] , (3)
while the Republican party payo⁄ is:
￿ + T (vR) + vR ￿ PD (vD ￿ vR ￿ ￿)[￿ + T (vR) + vR ￿ vD] . (4)
The interesting di⁄erence between these payo⁄s is captured by ￿; our measure
of political competition. As we will see, because ￿ < 0 the Democratic party
￿ or, more generally, the party with an electoral advantage￿ is less pro-
growth. The trade-o⁄ facing parties is quite simple: o⁄ering a higher utility
to swing voters increases a party￿ s chance of winning, but reduces the rents
(T) captured if winning.
2.3 Equilibrium
What does our model predict about the e⁄ects of political competition, as
measured by ￿? Formally, we can represent an equilibrium of the model by a
pair of utility levels fvD;vRg 2 [v;v]; which forms a Nash equilibrium in the
pre-election game between the two parties, given the equilibrium behavior of
voters. As above, we illustrate the results in the case where ￿ < 0, i.e., the
electorate is biased towards the Democrats.
We study an equilibrium where two assumptions hold:
6In Besley, Persson and Sturm (2006), our political setup had explicit micro-political
foundations. In that model a rent-seeking motive arises due to lobbying of the incumbent
party by a group of vested interests in the population.
7Assumption 1
2 + Tv (￿ v) < 0 ;
the party reaction functions slope upwards in a neighborhood of v; and
Assumption 2
(1 + Tv (￿ v))
2
+ ￿￿ < 0 ,
the party￿ s marginal cost of foregone rents exceeds the marginal bene￿t of
ideological stance, at the point of undistorted policy. Under these conditions,
dominant parties will tend to pick an outcome where vp < v. Note that
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold if ￿ is close enough to zero, i.e. if rents are
su¢ ciently concentrated.
The key result linking policy and political competition (proof in the The-
ory Appendix) is:
Proposition 1 If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, an equilibrium exists and the
e⁄ect of political competition on economic outcomes has three ranges:
1. For ￿ below a lower threshold (￿L) the Democrats pursue their own
preferred (anti-growth) policy and win for sure.
2. For ￿ in an intermediate range below a higher threshold (￿H), the Re-
publicans pick more pro-growth policies than the Democrats. As compe-
tition increases, the probability that the Republicans win increases and
the Democrats move towards pro-growth policies.
3. For ￿ close enough to zero, the party ranking and the e⁄ect of political
competition on policy and economic growth are ambiguous.
These results give way naturally to an empirical approach. First, the
model guides our measurement of the key parameter ￿ gauging the degree of
political competition. Second, we test the main prediction in Proposition 1
￿that greater political competition improves economic policy. Third, we can
also test the prediction that the e⁄ect of ￿ arises from political competition
rather than the party in power.
A more speci￿c prediction is that the e⁄ect of ￿ should be non-linear
re￿ ecting the three cases in Proposition 1. At low levels of political compe-
tition, the dominant party is unassailable, picks its preferred outcome, and
leave swing voters with utility v. Thus, a further deterioration in political
8competition has no e⁄ect on policy. The e⁄ect of political competition is
at its largest in an intermediate interval (between ￿L and ￿H), where two
forces create pro-growth policies as competition increases. The dominant
party adapts its policies towards the preferences for growth of swing voters,
and the lagging party, which pursues a maximum-growth policy (vR = ￿ v);
increases its chances of winning. When competition becomes more intense
(above ￿H), the pro-growth forces are again weaker. As the the lagging
party raises its chances of winning, it obtains more scope to pursue a policy
of rent-seeking rather than growth.
2.4 Discussion
Our model captures a very simple mechanism which arguably resonates well
with why we think competition may be bene￿cial in other ￿elds. The model
provides a useful way to structure our thinking about what may be driving
the empirical results we present below in the context of U.S. states. However,
we are certainly not claiming that the ￿nding in Proposition 1 represents
a general proposition relating policy and growth to political competition.
Moreover, the existing literature o⁄ers some reasons to be circumspect.
The conclusion that competition enhances policies conducive to growth
may, for example, be overturned in a model that highlighted dynamic incen-
tives along the lines of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). In their world, more
competition could intensify political instability, which in turn might diminish
the incentive for incumbents to implement growth-enhancing reforms rather
than seeking short-term rents.
Nor does our model o⁄er any clear-cut welfare implication of increasing
political competition. Even if growth increases, there can be gainers and
losers such that, e.g., a Utilitarian measure of welfare could rise or fall. This
possibility is consistent with the broader literature on political competition.
For example, Lizzeri and Persico (2005) argues that competition, as measured
by the number of parties, may reduce welfare. The mechanism behind this
results is that proliferation in parties can channel resources into targeted
transfers rather than general-interest public goods. Similar results would also
hold in models in which intensi￿ed political competition resulted in increased
reliance of wasteful campaign contributions.7
7However, the precise micro-foundations for campaign ￿nance would be important for
this conclusion, since in a model along the lines of Coate (2004), some campaign contri-
93 Historical Background and Data
3.1 Historical Background
While the United States has been a vibrant democracy since its foundation,
it has experienced substantial variation in the degree of political competi-
tion. During our period of interest, many states have seen long periods of
substantial Republican majorities in elections. Vermont, for example, was
dominated by the Republican Party for over a century until the 1960s. In
this period, Republicans controlled virtually all state-wide o¢ ces and were
frequently elected with over 70 percent of the vote.
However, the most dramatic departure from competitive elections was a
virtual monopoly of the Democratic Party in many states of the US south for
much of the period from the 1900s until the mid 1960s.8 In the remainder of
this subsection, we discuss the changes in political competition in the south
and how they can be seen through the lens of our model.
After the end of the civil war in 1865 blacks for the ￿rst time enjoyed both
civil rights and voting rights. The 14th amendments to the constitution
(rati￿ed in 1868) formalized civil rights irrespective or race and the 15th
amendment (rati￿ed in 1870) stipulated
￿the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude￿ .
With the withdrawal of the last northern troops in 1877, however, the south-
ern states quickly eroded the newly gained rights of blacks. The passage
of the so-called Jim Crow laws imposed racial segregation on many aspects
of public life ranging from schools, over parks and public libraries, to burial
grounds. Kousser (1974) documents how the vigorous political competition in
the US south in the 1870s started to decline throughout the 1880s and 1990s.
While the Democratic party had gained control of all state governments in
the south by the 1880s, e⁄ective opposition to the Democratic party ended
with the introduction of various voting restrictions, notably literacy tests and
poll taxes, during the second half of the 1890s and early 1900s. These restric-
tions immediately and sharply reduced election turnout of black and poor
butions can increase welfare.
8See, inter alia, Wright (1987, 1999), Key (1950) and Davidson and Grofman (1994)
for an extensive analysis of the US south.
10white voters ￿which constituted the power base of southern Republicans all
the way up to the 1960s ￿and e⁄ectively eliminated any serious opposition
to the Democratic party. The sharp downturn in political competition in the
south around this time is clearly visible in our speci￿c measure of political
competition in Figure 1.
The Democratic party￿ s monopoly on power in the US south went essen-
tially unchallenged until the 1960s. The civil rights movement of the 1950s
and 1960s culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On the other hand,
the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) came much more as a surprise. For exam-
ple, it was not even mentioned in Lyndon Johnson￿ s 1965 State of the Union
Address, which otherwise contained a record-long legislative agenda for his
new term. Political conditions changed very quickly, however, in response to
the graphic media coverage of brutal crackdowns on March 7, 1965 by state
troopers on protesters against political discrimination, who were marching
from Selma, AL, to the state capital of Montgomery. Johnson could collect
enough support from congressional Republicans to pass the VRA into law by
the summer, despite the opposition of southern Democrats.9
The 1965 VRA reintroduced political competition in the US south. It
gave the Attorney General authority to appoint federal examiners to oversee
voter registration in states, or counties, using literacy or quali￿cation tests
and where less than 50% of the voting age population had voted in the 1964
presidential election. He could also seek legal action against poll taxes as a
prerequisite for voting in state elections, and the Supreme Court ruled such
usage illegal in a 1966 decision, which became directly binding on Alabama,
Mississippi, Texas and Virginia.10 The elimination of voting rights restric-
tions induced a sharp increase in turnout and triggered a step increase in
political competition, which is clearly visible in Figure 1.11
The set of political changes that took place in the south over this period
are quite complex. In our simple model, we can interpret these changes
through the derived parameter ￿; which is determined by voter preferences
9See Mackaman (2005) for a concise historical account of the political events that led
to the passing of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
10Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections (1966). South and North Carolina,
Louisiana, Georgia, Florida, Arkansas, and Tennessee had abolished their poll taxes at an
earlier date.
11Davidson and Grofman (1994), Black and Black (2003), and Vallely (2004) give de-
tailed accounts of how the Voting Rights Act changed southern politics with regards to
minority representation and the Democratic stronghold on power.
11and the composition of the electorate into partisans and swing voters.12 It
is a non-trivial task to validate such changes from independent sources. The
best source is probably the data in the biannual National Election Studies
(NES), available from 1952 to 2002.13 The number of respondents in each
NES cross-section is quite small, at most 1500 in total, so it does not allow us
to reliably single out voters in individual states, let alone subdivide by race.
With this caveat, Figure 2 graphs an estimate of political competition ￿ for
the south and non-south over the 50 years of available surveys.14 The change
of ￿ in the south is particularly pronounced during and after the 1960s. This
change is, in part, due to a rise in the share of swing voters (￿ in the model),
as well as a fall in the share of partisan Democrats less partisan Republicans
(￿ in the model). The value of ￿ estimated from the NES is thus fully
consistent with the claim that southern competition increased drastically
from the 1960s. Most importantly the pattern of political competition that
emerges from the calibration is very similar to our main empirical measure
of political competition that we graph in Figure 1 and de￿ne in the next
subsection.
12This contrasts with a view that sees changes in party preferences as the prime driving
force of political change over the period.
13See http://www.umich.edu/~nes/
14The parameter ￿ is estimated as follows. Respondents in the NES are classi￿ed as
Republican if variable VCF0301 (￿Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as
a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?￿ ) is 6 (weak Republican) or 7 (strong
Republican), as Democrat if 1 (strong Democrat) or 2 (weak Democrat), or as swing voters
if 3 (independent closer to the Democratic Party), 4 (independent closer to neither party),
or 5 (independent closer to the Republican Party). We calculate the proportion of each
type in every state and year as the ratio of the number of Republicans/Democrats/swing
voters to the total number of respondents (excluding those with a missing value) each year.
(The sum of the three percentage points is not equal to a hundred as some respondents
are categorized as apolitical (their variable VCF0301 is 9)). Our estimate of ￿ = ￿
(1￿￿)￿
2￿￿
is then computed as follows. We take the proportion of Democrats less the proportion
of Republicans, i.e., (1 ￿ ￿)￿, and divide by the proportion of swing voters, i.e., ￿. We
then calibrate ￿ to a constant which implies a 1952 winning probability of 90% for the
Democrats in the South, i.e.,
1
2
￿ ￿ = 0:9 .
which implicitly normalizes ￿ = 1:
123.2 Data and Measurement
Our key explanatory variable is a measure of political competition in each
of the continental U.S. states over time. To construct that measure, we use
a data set originating in the work of Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002), who
collected election results for a broad set of directly elected state executive
o¢ ces, ranging from U.S. representatives, over the governorship, to down-
ballot o¢ cers, such as Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney
General, etc.15 The data set reports the average vote share of the Democrats
in all-state wide races in state s at time t; which we denote dst.
Our theory suggests that we should measure (the lack of) political com-
petition by the dominance of either the Democratic or Republican party in
state-wide elections.16 We thus de￿ne ￿st as the party-neutral measure
￿st = ￿jdst ￿ 0:5j . (5)
Because of the minus sign, higher values of this variable correspond to states
and periods with more political competition. The variable ￿st has a dis-
tribution heavily skewed to the right: while we have about 160 state-year
observations with political competition lower than ￿0:4; we have about 2400
observations with competition between ￿0:1 and 0.17 The spirit of our model
is to capture the e⁄ect of long-term shifts in political competition, whereas
our empirical measure mixes up short-term and long-term shifts. In the
empirical section, we emphasize the long-term shifts in two ways: we instru-
ment for political competition (see below), and average the date over longer
periods.
To measure the policy stance of the state government (￿ in the model),
we use three main variables: total state tax revenue as a percentage of state
personal income, state infrastructure spending measured by the percentage
share of capital outlays in total state government expenditure, and an indi-
cator variable whether or not a state has a right-to-work law. Increases in
15We are very grateful to Jim Snyder for sharing an updated and expanded version of
this dataset with us.
16We note that the rates of name recognition of the candidates for the down-ballot
o¢ ces is typically very low among voters. This makes it more likely that our measure of
political competition ￿to a substantial degree ￿is driven by party attachment of voters
rather than the popularity of individual politicians.
17Most states have statewide election in every other year or every four years. We linearly
interpolate our index of political competition for year in which no statewide elections take
places.
13the share of capital expenditure at the expense of current expenditure and
reductions in the total tax burden are policies which are widely believed to
be conducive to economic development. Right-to-work laws make it illegal
to demand that employees join a union, or to automatically deduct union
fees from wages. Holmes (1998) documents that right-to-work laws appear
to have strong e⁄ects on the location choices of business across US state
borders.
To explore whether political competition not only a⁄ects policy choices,
but also economic growth (as in the model), we use the growth rate of state
personal income as an alternative dependent variable.18 Closely related is
the share of non-farm income in total personal income of the state, as a
measure of structural change. To investigate whether our results are indeed
due to changes in political competition rather than policy di⁄erences between
the Democratic and Republican party, we use an indicator variable of the
governor￿ s party a¢ liation and the party composition of the state upper and
lower houses to create indicator variables whether any one party controls
both chambers of the state legislature.19 As a further proxy for state policy
preferences we also control, linearly, for the democratic votes share (dst) that
enters our measure of political competition.
As discussed further below, our measure of political competition is not
necessarily exogenous to the outcome variables. We therefore use the federal
intervention in the US south via the 1965 Voting Rights Act as an additional
source of exogenous variation. For this purpose we construct a variable,
which is equal to the share of the state population subject to either a lit-
eracy test or a poll tax (or both) that attracted the attention of the 1965
Voting Rights Act. Prior to 1965 this variable is equal to one in Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and equal
to 0:4 and 0:034 in North Carolina and Arizona respectively.20 As mentioned
above, these voting rights restrictions were introduced at the beginning of
the 20th century. The Data Appendix provides detailed sources for each of
our variables. Table 1 reports (conditional) means and standard deviations
for the variables we use to establish the empirical results in the next section.
18As GDP data at the state level is only available from 1963 onwards we follow the
US state literature (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004) and use state personal
income as our measure of state output.
19These data were previously used in Dal B￿ et al. (2007) and we are grateful to Ernesto
Dal B￿ for sharing the data with us.
20A similar strategy has previously been used by Husted and Kenny (1997).
144 Empirical Strategy and Results
We discuss the empirical results in two steps. We ￿rst look for a link between
political competition and policy choices. In a second step, we investigate
whether there is also a reduced form link between political competition and
growth.
4.1 Policy
The crucial mechanism highlighted by Proposition 1 is that political compe-
tition changes the incentives of politicians to implement growth-promoting
policies. In particular our theoretical model suggests that increases in polit-
ical competition should make policy choices more pro-business. To examine
this link empirically we estimate regressions of the form
￿st = ￿s + ￿t + ￿￿st + "st , (6)
where ￿st is a measure of the policy stance in state s at time t and ￿s and
￿t are state and year ￿xed e⁄ects, respectively. We estimate robust standard
errors adjusted for clustering at the state level. As mentioned in the data
section, we consider three di⁄erent measures for ￿st: total state tax revenue
as a percentage of state personal income, state infrastructure spending mea-
sured by the percentage share of capital outlays in total state government
expenditure, and whether a state has a right-to-work law. Below we also
consider speci￿cations which add a number of additional control variables to
(6) and instrument for political competition.
Columns (1), (4) and (7) of Table 2 contain estimates of the basic spec-
i￿cation in equation (6) for our three policy measures. We ￿nd that strong
political competition is indeed associated with pro-business policy choices.
In particular, increases in political competition reduce state tax revenue as a
share of state personal income, increase our measure of infrastructure spend-
ing, and also increases the probability that a state has a right-to-work law.
The remaining columns of Table 2 consider two alternative economet-
ric speci￿cations. The large-scale changes in political competition in the
US south have clearly been associated with other important changes in the
southern economy and society which could be correlated with policy choices.
To capture these wider changes in a non-parametric way we include interac-
tions between the time dummies and an indicator variable for the 16 southern
states as de￿ned by the U.S. Census. Columns (2), (5) and (8) show that
15our estimates are very similar in this alternative speci￿cation that allows for
di⁄erent trends in the US north and south in a ￿ exible (non-parametric) way.
The ￿nal set of regressions in Table 2 address the possibility of reverse
causation from policy choices to the degree of political competition. To mini-
mize such endogeneity, which would plausibly bias our estimates downwards,
we instrument political competition with the exogenous intervention of the
federal government in southern politics through the 1965 VRA as discussed
in Section 3.2 above. In particular, we instrument political competition with
a variable which is equal to the share of the state population subject to either
a literacy test or a poll tax (or both) that attracted the attention of the 1965
VRA and zero after 1965.21 Columns (3), (6) and (9) of Table 2 show that
the IV estimates are indeed somewhat larger than our OLS estimates and
highly statistically signi￿cant.
Our estimates are not only statistically signi￿cant, but also economically
important. The OLS estimate of the impact of political competition on taxes
in Column (1) of Table 2, for example, suggests that an increase in political
competition by about 0:3 ￿a typical variation in political competition in
many southern states over the last century ￿reduces state tax revenue as a
share of state personal income by about 1 percentage point relative to a sam-
ple mean of 5:7 percent. Similarly, the OLS estimate in Column (4) implies
that such an increase in political competition increases state infrastructure
spending measured by the share of capital spending in total state expenditure
by about 1:5 percentage points relative to a sample mean of 15:5 percent.
Table 3 investigates three additional implications of our theoretical model.
Our model predicts that policy choices are shaped by the degree of political
competition rather than by party preferences. While our results so far are
consistent with this view, an obvious alternative explanation of our ￿ndings
could be di⁄erent policy preferences between Democrats and Republicans. In
particular, the period of increasing political competition in the US south was
also a period of increased Republican representation among state governors
and legislators.
To address this possibility, Columns (1), (5) and (9) of Table 3 include
21The IV-strategy also addresses another possible bias in the estimate of ￿. Our empirical
measure of political competition ￿ uctuates substantially from one election to the next and
these short-run ￿ uctuations will poorly approximate the underlying degree of political
competition, which our model emphasizes. The IV strategy relying on once-and-for-all
removals of voting restrictions would remove the downward bias associated with such
measurement error.
16our measures of the party a¢ liation of the governor and indicators for which
party controls both houses of the state legislature.22 Whereas these control
variables have point estimates which are consistent with commonly held views
about the Democratic and Republican party, our estimates of the impact of
political competition are quantitatively very similar to our previous estimates
and remain statistically signi￿cant. In Columns (2), (6) and (10), we also
include the share of the Democratic vote as a further control variable.23
While it is less plausible to treat this variable as exogenous (due to its direct
dependence on vD and vR) than the party control variables, our results are
broadly robust to this further control. The results on taxation and capital
spending are very similar, but the coe¢ cient on competition for the right-to-
work laws is now smaller in size and not signi￿cant.24
The second and related implication of our theoretical model is that both
parties change their policy stance in the same way if they are the dominant
party. To examine this property of the model, we create separate variables for
the impact of political competition on Democratic and Republican governors,
which are included in Columns (3), (7) and (11) of Table 3. While the point
estimates for the impact of political competition is the same for Democratic
and Republican governors with the exception of the right-to-work laws, we
￿nd that the impact on Democratic governors is estimated substantially more
precisely and is quantitatively more important.
Third, we take seriously the prediction of our model that political compe-
tition has a non-linear e⁄ect. According to Proposition 1, we should see small
e⁄ects on policy both at very low and very high levels of competition. Instead,
the main impact should occur at intermediate levels of political competition,
when the dominant party starts improving its policy stance. Columns (4),
(8) and (12) of Table 3 explore this issue. Speci￿cally, we create binary
indicators for values of political competition larger than ￿0:10,￿0:25, and
22We drop the small number of observations with independent governors from these
regressions.
23Note that we can include both the Democratic vote share (dt) and our measure of
political competition (￿jdt ￿ 0:5j) in the regression because of the kink in our measure of
competition when the Democratic vote share reaches 50 percent. However, it would not
be possible to separately identify these two variables if we allowed for an arbitrary break
in the marginal e⁄ect of the Democratic vote share at 50 percent.
24As a further robustness test, we have also interacted our measures of party control
and the share of the Democratic vote share with the indicator for the 16 southern states.
However, also with these additional regressors (results not shown) the e⁄ect of political
competition on policy choices remains very similar.
17￿0:4; respectively, and include these, rather than the continuous measure
of political competition in our standard speci￿cation. Thus, the estimated
e⁄ect of a change in political competition from below ￿0:4 into the range
￿0:10 to ￿0:25, for example, is the sum of the coe¢ cients on the last two
indicator variables. The results show that the e⁄ect of political competition
indeed appears to be non-linear. Quantitatively, the largest policy changes
due to greater competition typically come about when competition exceeds
￿0:25.25
Table 4 presents two further robustness checks of our results. The ￿rst
six columns in this table re-estimate the speci￿cations in Columns (1), (5)
and (9) of Table 3 separately for the states in the US south and US north.
The results show that with the exception of right-to-work laws, which seem
to be mainly driven by the variation in the US south, the estimates on both
sub-samples are surprisingly similar. The ￿nal three columns in Table 4 look
at the lower frequency variation in the data, so as to emphasize the longer-
term shifts in political competition, by estimating on ￿ve-year averages. The
results are very similar in this alternative speci￿cation as well. These re-
sults further strengthen the conclusion that the association between political
competition and economic policies is not an artefact of any particular esti-
mation method and a speci￿c historical episode, but is a robust result across
a number of di⁄erent identi￿cation approaches and samples.
Taken together, these results support our core theoretical proposition that
increased political competition has substantial e⁄ects on policy choices and
promotes the implementation of policies that are widely believed to promote
economic growth.
4.2 Growth
We now turn to the question whether the e⁄ects of political competition
on state policies extend to measurable changes in economic performance.
Absent a fully structural model, which would allow us to identify the impact
of a range of policies on economic performance, we take the more modest
approach of exploring whether there is a reduced-form relationship between
economic growth and political competition.
Following (1) and (6), we estimate the relationship between political com-
25The results of this speci￿cation are also very similar if one excludes our set of party
control variables from these regressions.
18petition and economic growth with a standard growth regression of the form26
gst = ￿s + ￿t + ￿yst￿1 + ￿￿st + "st , (7)
where gst is the annual growth rate of personal income in state s at time
t; ￿s and ￿t are state and year ￿xed e⁄ects, and where yst￿1 is the usual
convergence term allowing for Solow-style convergence of per capita income
with ￿ < 0 indicating income convergence.27 Our key regressor of interest is
again our measure of political competition ￿st and we want to test whether
￿ > 0, i.e. sti⁄er political competition raises the growth rate of state personal
income.
Column (1) of Table 5 reports the results of OLS estimates of (7) on our
basic data set which runs from 1929, the ￿rst year for which Census estimates
of state personal income are available, to 2001. Consistent with the model
predictions, we ￿nd a positive association between political competition and
growth, which is statistically signi￿cant at conventional levels. These results
hold up when we include south-year interactions in Column (2) and when we
instrument political competition with the federal interventions to eliminate
voting restrictions in Columns (3) and (4). Again, the e⁄ect we ￿nd is not
only statistically signi￿cant, but quantitatively important. The estimate in
Column (1) implies, for example, that an increase in political competition
from ￿0:3 to zero, which would be typical for many southern US states over
the last century, raised long-run personal income per capita by about 15
percent.28
Table 6 collects a number of additional results on the link between po-
litical competition and growth. Columns (1) through (4), show that ￿as in
Table 3 ￿the e⁄ect of political competition is robust to controlling for party
representation and non-linear as suggested by our theory. Column (3) also
suggests that the e⁄ect of competition on Democratic and Republican gov-
ernors is much more similar in this context than in the policy regressions. It
might be tempting to suspect that the growth e⁄ect is identi￿ed exclusively
from variation in the southern states. In Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 we
also estimate the growth regressions separately for the states in the US north
26For an early discussion of panel growth regressions see Caselli et al. (1996).
27There are well-known econometric issues with dynamic panels that include state ￿xed
e⁄ects, but the large number of time periods (in most speci￿cations 72) makes us con￿dent
that any such bias is of small order. We return to this issue below.
28Note that the long-run e⁄ect of political competition on income implied by the esti-
mates obtained from (7), is given by: ￿￿=￿.
19and US south. While the estimates are too imprecise to reach statistical sig-
ni￿cance at conventional levels, the e⁄ect of political competition is again
positive and of similar magnitude in both sub-samples.
In Column (7), we look at ￿ve-year averages of growth, which allows
us not only to emphasize the long-term shifts in political competition, but
also to smooth out some of the short-term volatility in income. The results
are broadly robust with higher growth again being associated with greater
political competition. Column (8) investigates the possible bias of estimating
these ￿ve-year growth rates with state ￿xed e⁄ects in the presence of a lagged
dependent variable. Here, we use the Arellano and Bond GMM 1st di⁄erence
estimator, as recommended by Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996). The
speci￿cation uses one additional lag of state personal income as an instrument
for the lagged dependent variable. We again ￿nd very similar results.
The theory is based on the idea that greater political competition changes
policy so as to allocate resources away from the traditional sector. A rea-
sonable interpretation of the identity of the traditional sector, particularly in
the US south, is agriculture. To test this prediction, we thus use the share
of non-farm income in state personal income as the left hand side variable.
Column (9) in Table 6 shows that political competition is indeed strongly
positively associated with the share of non-farm income in total income.
While 1929 is the ￿rst year when Census estimates of state personal in-
come are available, there are widely used estimates of state personal income
by Easterlin (1960) for the years 1880, 1900 and 1920.29 As illustrated in
Figure 1, this was a period in which political competition in the US south
declined sharply. A key attraction of the 1880-1920 period is that potentially
important omitted variables that may confound our growth estimates for the
1929-2001 period are unlikely to be relevant during this period. For example,
the spread of air conditioning from the early 1920s until the 1960s and rapid
technical progress in southern agriculture are likely to have contributed to
economic growth after 1920 and could be correlated with political compe-
tition.30 Similarly, while the improvement in race relations after the civil
29The methodology and data sources behind these estimates di⁄ers from the modern
estimates and it is therefore not sensible to pool these early income estimates with the
later Census estimates.
30See, for example, Arsenault (1984) for an historical account of the spread of air con-
ditioning and Mitchener and McLean (2003) for an assessment of the importance of air
conditioning for southern productivity relative to other factors. Caselli and Coleman
(2001) document the importance of technological progress in the agricultural sector for
20rights movement may have directly contributed to economic development,
race relations were relatively unchanged over much of the period from 1880
to 1920.31
Table 7 displays our estimation results from this early period. We regress
average annual growth in state personal income over the two 20-year periods
against the same covariates as in Tables 5 and 6 (measured as averages over
each period). In this extremely short panel, we are unable to include state
￿xed e⁄ects, as this would substantially bias the results in the presence of a
lagged dependent variable. Column (1) shows that the correlation between
political competition and economic growth reported in Tables 5 and 6 holds
up in the early sample. In Column (2), we ￿nd that the same is true when
we include a dummy for the southern states and south-year interactions.
Columns (3), (4) and (5) show that in this case as well the e⁄ect of political
competition is distinct from party representation. Columns (6) and (7) show
that the results hold up when we look separately at southern and northern
states.
Taken together, these results suggest that changes in political competi-
tion not only change state policies, but also have a quantitatively important
impact on economic growth. The striking similarity between the results in
the growth regressions and the policy regressions adds further support to the
view that the mechanism driving our results is indeed that political compe-
tition induces a shift towards pro-growth policies.
5 Concluding Comments
This paper develops a simple model to illustrate how greater political com-
petition might lead to the adoption of pro-growth policies. We also present
evidence to substantiate this proposition using data on US states. Using a
measure of competition suggested by the theory, we show that increases in
political competition are associated with lower tax revenue as a share of state
personal income, a higher level of infrastructure spending by state govern-
ments, and a higher probability that a state uses a right-to-work law. These
results are robust across a variety of speci￿cations and subsamples of our
the convergence of the US south.
31Logan (1954) analyses the rise in open racism in the US south after the end of the
reconstruction and argues that the turn of the last century was probably the low point of
race relations in the US south.
21data. Moreover, the relationship appears to be non-linear, with the largest
e⁄ects at intermediate levels of political competition, as the model implies.
The policy changes we document also seem to a⁄ect overall state economic
performance with greater political competition being associated with higher
growth rates of state personal income per capita.
While our evidence is for a speci￿c country and time period, it supports
a common theme in political economics. Throughout our sample period,
the US states were well functioning democracies. But lopsided competition
in particular states and subperiods meant that policies could be tailored
to vested interests rather than the entire population, resulting in stagnant
growth. Whether break-downs of monopoly power in politics have signi￿cant
consequences for policy and growth in other settings cannot be inferred from
these results, and we have emphasized that there is no general theoretical
presumption that this is the case. Nonetheless, whether similar results can
be found in other contexts is ripe for investigation.
22References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson, [2006], ￿Economic Backward-
ness in Political Perspective￿ , American Political Science Review, 100
(1), 115-131.
[2] Ansolabehere, Stephen and James M. Snyder, Jr., [2002], ￿The Incum-
bency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal
O¢ ces, 1942-2000,￿Election Law Journal, 1(3), 315-338.
[3] Arsenault, Raymond, [1984], ￿The End of the Long Hot Summer: The
Air Conditioner and Southern Culture￿ , The Journal of Southern His-
tory, 50(4), 597-628.
[4] Barro, Robert and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2004) Economic Growth, Cam-
bridge: MIT Press.
[5] Besley, Timothy and Anne Case, [2003], ￿Political Institutions and Pol-
icy Choices: Evidence from the United States,￿Journal of Economic
Literature, 41(1), 7-73.
[6] Besley, Timothy, Torsten Persson, and Daniel Sturm, [2006], ￿Political
Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from
the United States￿ , mimeo, LSE.
[7] Black, Earl and Merle Black, [2003], The Rise of Southern Republicans,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[8] Caselli, Francesco, Gerardo Esquivel, and Fernando Lefort, [1996],
￿Reopening the Convergence Debate: A New Look at Cross-Country
Growth Empirics￿ , Journal of Economic Growth, 1(3), 363-390.
[9] Caselli, Francesco and W. John Coleman II, [2001], ￿The U.S. Struc-
tural Transformation and Regional Convergence: A Reinterpretation￿ ,
Journal of Political Economy,109(3), 584-616.
[10] Coate, Stephen, [2004], ￿Political competition with Campaign Contribu-
tions and Informative Advertizing,￿Journal of the European Economics
Association, 2, 772-804.
23[11] Dal B￿, Ernesto, Pedro Dal B￿, and Jason Snyder, [2007], ￿Political
Dynasties￿ , mimeo.
[12] Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (eds.), [1994], The Quiet Rev-
olution in the South, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[13] Easterlin, Richard A., [1960], ￿Regional Growth of Income: Long Term
Tendencies￿in Simon Kuznets, Ann Ratner Miller and Richard A. East-
erlin (eds.) Analyses of Economic Change, Philadelphia, PA: The Amer-
ican Philosophical Society.
[14] Holmes, Thomas J., [1998], ￿The E⁄ect of State Policies on the Location
of Manufacturing: Evidence from State Borders￿ , Journal of Political
Economy, 106(4), 667-705.
[15] Husted, Thomas and Lawrence Kenny, [1997], ￿The E⁄ect of the Ex-
pansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government￿ , Journal of
Political Economy, 105(1), 54-82.
[16] Key, V. O., [1950], Southern Politics in State and Nation, New York,
NY: A.A. Knopf.
[17] Kousser, J. Morgan, [1974], The Shaping of Southern Politics: Su⁄rage
Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
[18] Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico, [2005], ￿A Drawback of Elec-
toral Competition,￿ Journal of the European Economic Association,
3(6), 1318-1348.
[19] Logan, Rayford W., [1954], The Negro in American Life and Thought:
The Nadir, 1877-1901, New York, NY: The Dial Press.
[20] Mackaman, Frank, [2005], ￿Commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of
the Passage of the Voting Rights Act￿ , Mimeo, Howard H. Baker Center
for Public Policy, University of Tennessee.
[21] Mitchener, Kris James and Ian W. McLean, [2003], ￿The Productivity
of US States since 1880￿ , Journal of Economic Growth, 8(1), 73-114.
[22] Ogden, Frederic D., [1958], The Poll Tax in the South, University, AL:
The University of Alabama Press.
24[23] Pempel, T. J. (ed.), [1990], Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party
Dominant Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
[24] Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, [2000], Political Economics: Ex-
plaining Economic Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[25] Polo, Michele [1998], ￿Electoral Competition and Political Rents￿ ,
Mimeo, IGIER, Bocconi University.
[26] Stigler, George, J. [1972], ￿Economic Competition and Political Com-
petition￿ , Public Choice, 13(1), 91-106.
[27] Svensson, Jakob [1998], ￿Controlling Spending: Electoral Competition,
Polarization, and Primary Elections￿ , Mimeo, The World Bank.
[28] United States Bureau of Census, State Government Finances, Washing-
ton, DC, various years.
[29] Wittman, Donald, [1989], ￿Why Democracies Produce E¢ cient Re-
sults￿ , Journal of Political Economy, 97(6), 1395-1424.
[30] Wittman, Donald, [1995], The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Polit-
ical Institutions are E¢ cient, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
[31] Vallely, Richard M., [2004], The Two Reconstructions, Chicago, IL: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
[32] Wright, Gavin, [1987], ￿The Economic Revolution in the South,￿Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 1(1), 161-178.
[33] Wright, Gavin, [1999], ￿The Civil Rights Revolution as Economic His-
tory,￿Journal of Economic History, 59(2), 267-289.
256 Theory Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by proving:
Lemma A1: An equilibrium exists.
Proof: If ￿￿ ￿ 1
2￿ + v ￿ v, then 1 + Tv (v￿
D) = 0 or v￿
D = v and existence
is trivial. Hence, suppose that ￿￿ < 1






￿ ￿ [￿￿ + x ￿ f (x)]
￿
(1 + Tx (f (x)))
+￿ [￿ + (f (x) + T (f (x))) ￿ x] = 0 :
Observe that f (x) > v for all x 2 [v;v] since 1 + Tv (v) = 0. Now, let:
vR (x) =
￿
v if f (x) > v
f (x) for f (x) 2 (v;v] .





+ ￿ [￿￿ + x ￿ vR (x)]
￿
(1 + Tx (x))+￿ [￿ + (x + T (x)) ￿ vR (x)] .





+ ￿ [￿￿ + v ￿ vR (v)]
￿







(1 + Tv (v)) + ￿￿ by Assumption 1
< 0 by Assumption 2 if ￿ ￿ > 0 .
Since H (￿) is continuous, there exists (by the intermediate value theorem) a
v￿






+ v ￿ v
as the level of ￿ which guarantees victory to the Democrats in this circum-
stance.
26Lemma A2: If ￿ ￿ ￿L the Democratic party wins for sure and picks ￿ = 1
and v￿
D = v.
Proof: This follows by observing that for ￿ ￿ ￿L, the Democrats win for
sure and hence pick their ideal policy.￿
Now de￿ne:
￿￿H = ￿￿L +
￿
(1 + Tv (￿ v))
.
Lemma A3: For ￿ 2 (￿L;￿H), v < v￿
D < v = v￿
R:
Proof: First, we show for all ￿ < ￿H, the Republicans will pick vR = v. To
see this, observe that at vR = v and vD = v, the change in the payo⁄ of the




￿ ￿ [￿￿ + v ￿ v]
￿




￿ ￿ [￿￿H + v ￿ v]
￿
(1 + Tv (￿ v)) + ￿￿ = 0
from the de￿nition of ￿L. Moreover, Assumption 1 implies that this inequal-
ity holds for all vD > v.
Second, we show that it is optimal for the Democrats to pick v￿
D < v.







(1 + Tv (￿ v)) + ￿￿ <
(1 + Tv (￿ v))
2
+ ￿￿ < 0 ,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 2. Thus, the best response
for the Democrats must be vD < v. To see that vD > v , observe that






+ ￿ [￿ + vD (v;￿) ￿ v]
￿
((1 + Tv (vD (v;￿)))) (8)
= ￿ [￿ + vD (v;￿) + T (vD (v;￿)) ￿ v] . (9)
At any point where this equality holds, ((1 + Tv (vD (v;￿)))) < 0. Moreover,
a maximum exists on [v;v]. Elementary arguments now show that, at any
point satisfying (8); vD (v;￿) is increasing in ￿.￿
Lemma A4: There exists ￿ > ￿H, for which we have an interior equilibrium
with v￿
p 2 (v;v) for p 2 fD;Rg.
27Proof: For ￿ = 0, Assumption 2 implies that both parties will pick v￿
p < v
for p 2 fD;Rg. Moreover, since strategies are continuous in ￿, this holds for
some ￿ < 0. ￿
Collecting the results in Lemmas A1 through A4 above, we obtain the
comparative statics as stated in Proposition 1.￿
7 Data Appendix
Political competition: The vote share data underlying this variable was ob-
tained from Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002), and a recent update of this
data was kindly supplied by Jim Snyder in electronic form.
Taxation and capital outlays as a share of total state government spending:
These variables were supplied by the Bureau of the Census in electronic
format and were originally published in the annual publication State Gov-
ernment Finances.
Right-to-work laws: The spread of right-to-work laws is documented by the
National Right to Work Legal Defence Foundation at http://www.nrtw.org/.
Total personal income and the share of non-farm income: Estimates of state
personal income and its components are available from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis for the period after 1929. For the period before 1929 we
use the state personal income data for 1880, 1900 and 1920 from Easterlin
(1960).
Party a¢ liation of the governor: This information was obtained from the Na-
tional Governors Association at www.nga.org. Our indicator variable for the
party a¢ liation of the governor is equal to one if the governor is a Democrat,
equal to zero if he is a Republican and missing in the case of independents.
Composition of state legislatures: Information on the composition of the state
upper and lower house was taken from Dal B￿ et al. (2007) and was kindly
provided by Ernesto Dal Bo in electronic form. The data cover the period
from 1880 to 2001 for most states.
Voting Rights Act: Information on the history of the voting rights act, the
timing of the introduction and removal of literacy tests and poll taxes was




































Note: Each observation is a ten year average of our main measure of political competition
which ranges from -0.5 to 0 with larger values indicating more competition. See the main
text for further details.


































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
South Non-South
Figure 2 - Political Competition Calibrated from NES SurveysObs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Political competition 3504 -0.097 0.111 1168 -0.172 0.153 2336 -0.060 0.052
Democratic governor 3467 0.574 0.495 1167 0.791 0.407 2300 0.464 0.499
Democrats control state house and senate 3504 0.489 0.500 1168 0.918 0.275 2336 0.275 0.447
Republicans control state house and senate 3504 0.311 0.463 1168 0.031 0.173 2336 0.451 0.498
Democratic vote share 3504 0.550 0.139 1168 0.658 0.168 2336 0.497 0.079
State income growth rate 3456 0.022 0.067 1152 0.025 0.063 2304 0.020 0.069
Total tax revenue as a % of state personal income 2496 5.74 1.438 832 6.08 1.215 1664 5.57 1.509
Infrastructure spending as a % of state government exp. 2496 14.49 7.406 832 15.01 6.671 1664 14.23 7.737
Right-to-work laws 3504 0.274 0.446 1168 0.417 0.493 2336 0.203 0.402
Non-farm income as a share of total income  3456 0.934 0.081 1152 0.931 0.075 2304 0.935 0.084
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations both for all 48 continental US states and southern and northern (that is non-southern) states separately. Our 
measure of political competition varies from -0.5 to zero with larger values indicating more completion. Our measure of infrastructure spending is the percentage share 
of capital outlays in total state government expenditure. See the text for a full definition of all variables and the data appendix for sources.
Table 1 -- Means and Standard Deviations
All States Southern States Northern StatesTax revenue 
as a % of state 
income
Tax revenue 
as a % of state 
income
Tax revenue 
as a % of state 
income
Infrastructure 
spending as a 




spending as a 




spending as a 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Political competition     -3.036***     -2.362***     -4.718***      4.975***     5.070**    8.459**      0.973***      0.817***      1.504***
(0.590) (0.662) (1.366) (1.651) (2.449) (3.770) (0.221) (0.242) (0.315)
South × year interactions No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Method OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Sample 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1929-2001 1929-2001 1929-2001
First Stage F-Statistic 36.16 36.16 68.44
Observations 2496 2496 2496 2496 2496 2496 3504 3504 3504
R-squared 0.828 0.837 0.836 0.843 0.722 0.730
Table 2 -- Political Competition and Policy: Basic Results
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed effects as additional control variables. Our measure of infrastructure spending is capital outlays as a percentage of total state 
government expenditure. In parenthesis are standard errors which are robust against heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering at the state level.  * indicates significance at the 10 
percent level, ** significance at the 5 percent level and *** significance at the 1 percent level. Tax 
revenue as 










































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Political competition    -2.312***    -1.527**  4.889*    4.783**     0.760*** 0.289
(0.669) (0.582) (2.463) (2.198) (0.238) (0.238)
Political competition ×     -2.853***     5.910**      1.071***
Democratic governor (0.830) (2.829) (0.247)
Political competition × -0.413  1.310 -0.287 
Republican governor (0.585) (2.935) (0.277)
Political competition > -0.10  -0.128**  0.401* 0.010
(0.055) (0.237) (0.023)
Political competition > -0.25 -0.368* 1.107   0.150*
(0.217) (0.857) (0.077)
Political competition > -0.40 -0.226  1.049 0.016
(0.269) (0.788) (0.098)
Democratic governor 0.024 -0.002  -0.119* 0.000 -0.240  -0.237  0.028 -0.248  -0.022  0.003    0.060** 0.001
(0.055) (0.060) (0.063) (0.060) (0.213) (0.228) (0.325) (0.226) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.013)
Democrats control    0.167**     0.171**    0.176**   0.178** -0.586* -0.586*  -0.604* -0.611*    -0.080***   -0.073**    -0.083***   -0.078***
state house and senate (0.080) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.312) (0.312) (0.312) (0.311) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027)
Republicans control -0.117  -0.073  -0.111  -0.072  0.075 0.070 0.064 0.075    0.088**    0.055**     0.084***     0.057**
state house and senate (0.091) (0.088) (0.091) (0.089) (0.460) (0.467) (0.461) (0.469) (0.033) (0.025) (0.031) (0.025)
Democratic vote share      1.225**    1.182** -0.166   0.174     -0.813***     -0.731***
(0.513) (0.500) (1.926) (1.933) (0.192) (0.181)
South × year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Sample 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1929-2001 1929-2001 1929-2001 1929-2001
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 2478 2478 2478 2478 2478 2478 2478 2478 3467 3467 3467 3467
R-squared 0.839 0.842 0.841 0.842 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.742 0.754 0.749 0.756
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed effects as additional control variables. Our measure of infrastructure spending is capital outlays as a percentage of total state government 
expenditure. In parenthesis are standard errors which are robust against heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering at the state level.  * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** 
significance at the 5 percent level and *** significance at the 1 percent level.
Table 3 -- Political Competition and Policy: Party Effects and Non-linearitiesTax revenue  
as % of state 
income
Infrastructure 
spending as a 




Tax revenue  
as % of state 
income
Infrastructure 
spending as a 




Tax revenue  
as % of state 
income
Infrastructure 
spending as a 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Political competition    -2.656** 4.994       1.165***    -1.219**   3.874* -0.046       -3.295***   6.767*       1.011***
(0.911) (3.745) (0.287) (0.571) (2.205) (0.333) (0.961) (3.520) (0.311)
Democratic governor     0.142** -0.514  -0.032    -0.027   -0.138  -0.007   0.017 -0.352  -0.024 
(0.062) (0.546) (0.029) (0.074) (0.237) (0.017) (0.088) (0.330) (0.025)
Democrats control  -0.142   -0.032    -0.137**      0.231***  -0.682*    -0.087** 0.220 -0.632     -0.103**
state house and senate (0.205) (0.633) (0.062) (0.081) (0.358) (0.033) (0.142) (0.506) (0.050)
Republicans control    -0.405** 0.710     0.116**  -0.087   0.023     0.084** -0.193  0.124     0.129**
state house and senate (0.166) (0.504) (0.052) (0.094) (0.490) (0.032) (0.183) (0.697) (0.062)
South × year interactions N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes






Year sample 1950-2001 1950-2001 1929-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1929-2001 1950-1999 1950-1999 1929-2001
States in sample Southern Southern Southern Northern Northern Northern All All All
Observations 832 832 1167 1646 1646 2300 479 479 671
R-squared 0.807 0.805 0.759 0.847 0.857 0.719 0.872 0.898 0.768
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed effects as additional control variables. Our measure of infrastructure expenditure is capital outlays as a percentage of total state 
government expenditure. In parenthesis are standard errors which are robust against heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering at the state level.  * indicates significance at the 
10 percent level, ** significance at the 5 percent level and *** significance at the 1 percent level. 
Table 4 -- Political Competition and Policy: Further RobustnessGrowth of       
personal income
Growth of       
personal income
Growth of       
personal income
Growth of       
personal income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political competition       0.045***     0.028**       0.082***    0.051**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.023)
Lagged personal income      -0.095***      -0.104***      -0.105***     -0.108***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
South × year interactions No Yes No Yes
First stage F-statistic 50.49 25.03
Method OLS OLS IV IV
Sample 1929-2001 1929-2001 1929-2001 1929-2001
Observations 3456 3456 3456 3456
R-squared 0.651 0.677 0.649 0.676
Table 5 -- Political Competition and Economic Growth: Basic Results
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed effects as additional explanatory variables. In parenthesis are standard errors 
which are robust against heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering at the state level. * indicates significance at the 10 percent 
level, ** significance at the 5 percent level and *** significance at the 1 percent level. Growth of   
personal 
income
Growth of   
personal 
income
Growth of   
personal 
income
Growth of   
personal 
income
Growth of   
personal 
income
Growth of   
personal 
income
Growth of   
personal 
income





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Political competition     0.028**   0.032* 0.021 0.013     0.076**     0.165**       0.109***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.024) (0.035) (0.078) (0.035)
Political competition ×     0.029**
Democratic governor (0.014)
Political competition × 0.024
Republican governor (0.036)
Political competition > -0.10 0.000
(0.002)
Political competition > -0.25   0.010*
(0.005)
Political competition > -0.40 0.008
(0.006)
Democratic governor 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002      0.014*** 0.005 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Democrats control 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.000  0.002      0.021***  0.010  -0.012* 
state house and senate (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Republicans control 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003    0.014** 0.002 0.005 0.009  0.010*
state house and senate (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
Democratic vote share 0.006 0.011
(0.013) (0.013)
Lagged personal income      -0.102***      -0.101***      -0.102***      -0.101***      -0.067***      -0.123***     -0.340*** -0.874 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.039) (0.042)
South × year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes





Year sample  1929-2001 1929-2001 1929-2001 1929-2001 1929-2001 1929-2001 1930-1999 1930-1999 1929-2000
States in sample All All All All Southern Northern All All All
Observations 3420 3420 3420 3420 1152 2268 623 527 3421
R-squared 0.675 0.675 0.675 0.676 0.815 0.616 0.882 0.882
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed effects as additional control variables. The regressions in Columns (7) and (8) use five year averages of our data. Column (7) 
uses OLS while Column (8) uses the Arellano-Bond first difference estimator. In parenthesis are standard errors which are robust against heteroskedasticity and adjusted for 
clustering at the state level.  * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** significance at the 5 percent level and *** significance at the 1 percent level. 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Political competition     0.016**       0.020***       0.021***     0.027**   0.020*     0.049**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.021)
Political competition ×  0.017*
Democratic governor (0.009)
Political competition ×  0.036*
Republican governor (0.021)
Governor is a Democrat -0.001  -0.002  -0.003      0.031** -0.004 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005)
Democrats control 0.004 0.004 0.004    -0.029** 0.005
state house and senate (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
Republicans control 0.008 0.010 0.008 -0.006   0.009
state house and senate (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.024) (0.006)
Democratic vote share 0.009
(0.012)
Lagged personal income      -0.015***      -0.017***      -0.016***     -0.016***      -0.016***   -0.009**     -0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
South × year interactions No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS














States in sample All All All All All Southern Northern
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 31 62
R-squared 0.480 0.613 0.640 0.642 0.643 0.611 0.619
Notes: All regressions include time fixed effects as additional explanatory variables. The regressions in Columns (2), (3), (4) and (5) also include an 
indicator for the US south and an interaction between this indicator and the time dummies as additional regressors. In parenthesis are standard errors 
which are robust against heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering at the state level. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** significance 
at the 5 percent level and *** significance at the 1 percent level. 
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